Growth and Demographics

The World Bank, IMF, OECD, EU… all welcome the sustained economic momentum that is making Africa a lasting champion of growth: 4% is still expected in 2025, 4.3% in 2026-2027, and an annual rate of 4.5% is projected for the next twenty years, compared to 2.3% for the rest of the world, confirming this positive trend. However, it is estimated, with regret, that the continent's population growth will significantly offset this growth, with GDP per capita projected to increase by only 1.5%. And we are alarmed by the fact that, with two-thirds of humanity not reaching the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman (compared to 4 in Africa), its population will decline (by 20 to 50% by 2100 according to the UN), while it will suffer, Europe in particular, from a push from Africa, whose pool of assets will have increased from 850 million to 1.56 billion in 2050.

1. Are the UN's 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (defined in 2015) definitively compromised, along with the Emergence?

2. Should Europe expect an uncontrollable flow of migration?

Reminders: There is no single "Africa," except geographically. For the purposes of this discussion, the continent-wide approach glosses over, while still acknowledging, the significant disparities in situations, in order to highlight the key elements of the shared challenge of sustainable development. This Africa in development comprises the 54 nations of the African Union (including the countries recently excluded from the ESA, namely Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, as well as Guinea and Sudan), which are also signatories to the The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is being progressively activated. For an investor, the most relevant level of analysis remains country-by-country studies. The specialized council's analysis, drawing on its experience, examines the ratings and cross-references of the most relevant international reports and studies, as their assessments often contradict each other. / The EU is a market of 450 million consumers, Africa of 1.5 billion. / Specialists estimate an asset-to-inactive ratio of 1.7 is necessary to generate net growth.

1. Global Challenges: The UN's 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aim to combat poverty, inequality, environmental degradation, and the negative effects of climate change by ensuring prosperity, justice, and peace for all. Is this charity beginning at home? A reinterpretation of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris 1948)? A catching-up to the level achieved by developed economies? No, of course not. But if the goals are so interconnected, and if solidarity among developed countries is deemed necessary to achieve them, it is because the prospect of major antagonisms leading to ruptures, explosions, and large-scale revolutions would be seriously harmful to everyone. More than mutual interest, correcting inequalities of all kinds, including those perpetuated by history, and preparing a more harmonious future for humanity, stems first and foremost from a responsible, existential awareness. Because in our societies, wealth and poverty complement each other—so to speak—but too much wealth inevitably clashes with the excessive poverty it generates and from which it benefits. The pendulum must find a new equilibrium to avoid breaking and to serve its intended purpose. This is the meaning behind the UN's mobilization, calling for this kind of understanding between the strongest and the weakest.

Realistically, the UN, acknowledging that the 2030 goals, often translated into Development Plans in "developing" countries, will generally not be met, advocates for a completely different strategic approach for individual countries and refers to Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want , the African Union's fifty-year vision to "transform Africa into a global power of the future." On paper, this makes sense, as the continent possesses enormous, largely untapped potential: 70% of the world's uncultivated arable land, the largest solar energy potential among other renewable energy resources , a subsoil still rich in oil and gas, significant reserves of rare, strategic, or critical minerals for developed economies, an underemployed young population, and the capacity to capitalize on new technologies faster than elsewhere. Moreover, after only ten years of gestation, the AfCFTA project opens up the prospect of a very strong increase in intra- African trade and its exports of processed products, which should lead to additional net GDP growth.

However, nothing happens automatically; beyond intentions, several very real factors are hindering the master plan and the vision of the Agenda. Current real per capita income is still lower than in 2019, the pre-Covid year, and lower than the peak in 2015. In 2023, 47% of public revenue in sub-Saharan Africa was allocated to debt servicing, constraining the financing of essential services, health, education, and so on, significantly reducing the level of budgetary resources allocated to sustainable investments. Furthermore, the increasing cost of this debt makes access to credit more difficult, while the debt level of many countries is already high, even critical. IMF facilities (ECF, MED, DRF) continue to provide some relief in exchange for public "restructuring" measures and austerity policies. Official development assistance (ODA) from major countries is declining (and even more so following the commitment by EU members to increase military spending to 5% of their GDP). As for foreign direct investment (FDI), primarily directed towards energy transition minerals (lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements, etc.), extractive industries (hydrocarbons, iron, copper), and large-scale renewable energy projects , it represents only 4% of global flows and is insufficient for the development of infrastructure necessary to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and for the effectiveness of long-term investments. This vicious cycle reflects a lack of attractiveness compared to other regions of the world. In contrast to ODA and FDI, remittances from the African diaspora continue to grow, doubling in ten years to approach USD 100 billion, with 80% directed towards North and West Africa: this solidarity primarily addresses basic needs, with only a small portion going towards investment. Concessional loans and targeted grants? Just stopgaps. The situation could be further complicated by the decline in African exports to the US, should they maintain their decision to increase import tariffs.

It would be appropriate, you should…: in April 2024, the UN Economic Commission for Africa recommended holistic strategy profiles to African countries which, "fundamentally reorient their systems of production, consumption, governance, technology, and human and financial capital ." Certainly, geopolitical uncertainties and violations of established international trade rules, exacerbated in recent years, are reshuffling the cards. Yet, on closer inspection, the situation has only worsened, because the strongest (countries or global corporations) have always exerted pressure on the balance to increase their advantage; they are now doing so more forcefully and openly, precisely because they are stronger than before. This valuable UN advice, with its "shake-up" approach, takes the opposite stance to the practices of the IMF, which, while criticizing the perceived inefficiency of many governments' management, grants them additional funding without questioning the primary responsibility of decision-makers: thus, the recommended austerity measures (most recently the elimination of fuel subsidies) are implemented, but the threads of predation remain firmly in place!

Financial black hole in some public companies; ghost civil servants; lack of transparency in public accounts; unbalanced clauses in contracts related to hydrocarbons and strategic mineral resources; low rate of completion of public contracts; poor choices in major infrastructure projects; weak tax revenues (reduced economic inclusion due to a lack of political will, with the informal sector employing 82% of workers – while mobile money is a lever for accelerating inclusion, with 44% of adults in Africa already holding an account); free importation of basic foodstuffs (to the detriment of a consumption pattern focused on local products); export of agricultural products, minerals or hydrocarbons with little or no added value from processing; selective justice; increased insecurity (terrorism and local crime) and a proliferation of internal conflicts in some countries; lack of social housing in major cities (luxury real estate, hotels and offices are favored); political democracy is a facade in a number of cases (non-inclusive elections, accumulation of mandates, the role of watchdog of the "historical" parties in power, arranged parliamentary majorities, censorship...).

This inventory of the least virtuous obviously applies very differently from country to country and not to others. However, the combination of several indices based on statistical data and serious analyses tends to confirm still ineffective management, slowing growth and sustainable development in countries, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the Poverty Index Multidimensional ( IPM analyzing the dimensions of Health, Education, and Standard of Living) from the UNDP, the Gini coefficient measuring income inequality, the Corruption Perceptions Index from the NGO Transparency International, or the Ibrahim Index of African The IIAG ( Integrated International Governance Assessment ) highlights slow and insufficient progress over time to enable the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in sub-Saharan Africa. The IIAG, which consolidates 96 indicators common to the 54 countries (Security, Justice, Anti-Corruption / Rights, Inequality, Inclusion / Business Climate / Human Development, Health, Education), arrives at a score of 49.3 out of 100, an increase of only 1 point over the 2014-2023 period. It concludes that governance has stagnated (linked to the deterioration of security and the democratic landscape), "undermining the substantial progress made in human and economic development." This rather negative assessment masks completely contrasting trajectories, as 29 countries, representing half the continent's population, are dragging the average down, while 16 are achieving their best score in 2024.

“Substantial progress in human and economic development”: in reality, slow progress in reducing poverty, increasing school enrollment and life expectancy, providing the infrastructure necessary to improve living conditions (roads, transportation, water, electricity, public lighting, low-cost housing, etc.), and above all, creating jobs in the formal economy. Because to significantly reduce the dependence of African economies on fluctuations in global commodity prices and their invoicing currency (USD or Euro), which have directly and sometimes severely impacted them for decades, it is essential to ensure food self-sufficiency, diversify economies, and create value. Two conditions seem necessary to achieve this and truly enable sustainable development: a) efficient electricity coverage (solar and hybrid solutions are a tremendous opportunity) for cities and inland populations, allowing the continuous operation of all businesses/public services, banking services and information systems, the mechanization of craft work or agriculture, access to water (pumping) and irrigation, the processing and storage of produce, lighting and energy supply for villages… b) the creation of permanent productive agricultural or industrial and service jobs, particularly within a network of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and mid-sized companies (ETIs) strengthening competition, capable of operating in market conditions and a clear tax framework: the inclusion of these activities would constitute a significant source of tax revenue for public income and a boost for consumption. Large and very large companies/industries, both public and private (350 African champions generate revenues exceeding one billion USD according to McKinsey), must also benefit from the AfCFTA and be encouraged to recruit (and not just optimize their productivity as they already do through generative Artificial Intelligence, in particular); they could play a pivotal role at the regional level.

From 1990 to 2019, Africa's annual growth rate was 3.7%, with 78% coming from employment and 22% from productivity. Improving this level of growth and its components falls to public policies and official development assistance (ODA), supported by mutually beneficial cooperation agreements (financing, investments, technology transfers, know-how, and training). However, the role of national private actors and foreign private investors operating across all value chains with modern tools, in the primary and secondary sectors as well as in services, must be emphasized and encouraged, as it is crucial. It is this economic foundation and this "social class" of workers that could become the lasting drivers of sustainable development, because they are the most numerous, the best organized, and the most invested in progress, and not the large ranches of a non-inclusive agricultural revolution, large public and/or private companies acting alone, and certainly not large industries, as has been the case in Europe. Capital formation will be different, and so will its use. Africa doesn't need models—though good and bad examples are useful—its ingenuity must create its own original solutions. The World Bank's new 2024 annual report , Business Ready, explores this further. (replacing his study of the 190 countries in the Ease of Doing Business report), which provides a detailed review of the regulatory frameworks and actual business conditions in 50 economies, including 15 in Africa, effectively illustrates, with nuance, the dazzling array of specific trajectories in each economy. Africa is a kaleidoscope of a constantly evolving landscape; it must be used and observed, as through a telescope.

Over the same period from 1990 to 2019, annual GDP per capita grew by only 1.1%, impacted by a population boom of 2.6% per year. In comparison, China and India experienced annual growth rates of 8.9% and 6.2%, respectively, and annual GDP per capita growth of 8.4% and 4.6%, thanks to flatter population growth curves (averaging 0.7% and 1.5% annually). In fact, the evolution of a favorable labor force/non-labor force ratio enabled and accompanied this growth. China's labor force ratio was 1.7 in 1980, 2.7 in 2010, but is projected to reach 2.2 by 2035. India's ratio was 1.7 in 2006 and is expected to reach 2.2 by 2035, thanks to controlled population growth until 2050 (+15% compared to today). But managing this over time is not easy, as China knows all too well. After enforcing the one-child policy until 2015, it is now encouraging couples to have up to three children to maintain growth, because its population has aged rapidly and begun to decline, a drop estimated at 156 million individuals, or -11%, by 2050, according to the UN's "World Population Prospects 2024" report. Other countries are already experiencing a similar phenomenon negatively impacting their growth, with population declines of around 13% projected by 2050 in both Japan and Korea. This is a consequence of a shift between a larger working-age population and a growing number of inactive seniors (who will represent a quarter of the world's consumers by 2050) and a fall in fertility rates, linked to lifestyle choices.

So, must history repeat itself, and will the anticipated African growth be absorbed by sheer numbers? In contrast to a birth control/population limitation policy, unthinkable at first glance—at least until certain prerequisites are practically tested and validated—states like Nigeria and Ethiopia believe in the power of numbers, hence UN projections assigning them respective population figures of 359 million and 225 million in 2050, compared to 237 million and 135 million today—enough to frighten their neighbors! In Nigeria, the ratio of working-age to non-working-age population is projected at 1.2 in 2025 and 1.7 in 2067. Will Nigerians, especially young people, wait that long to verify the accuracy of the assumption of increased GDP per capita? And what about the lack of any guarantee of escaping multidimensional poverty for 100 million of them (or the 80 million living below the poverty line of $1.90 USD per day)? Public policies will need to be more imaginative and bolder to redistribute the fruits of growth. Because, in Nigeria as elsewhere, regardless of the hoped-for strength of the growth drivers, nothing is automatic; the quantity and quality of job opportunities will remain the determining factors, which implies urgent reforms, as also recommended by the World Bank. The World Bank's chief economist also confirms, in his latest semi-annual report, Africa's Pulse ("Improving Governance and Meeting People's Needs" ), that the pace of growth is not allowing for a significant reduction in poverty… expressing concern about a loss of trust among the population—particularly young people—in their governments.

Thus, the 2030 SDGs are legitimized by the progress made, but their realization and the emergence of emerging economies are therefore postponed . Yet, the implementation of mechanisms that promote and secure private investment, combined with the strengthening of public policies in education, health, housing, and other basic services (which will ultimately influence demographic trends), would allow for an improvement in anticipated growth rates, as well as a clearer and more equitable increase in GDP per capita – and therefore a more significant reduction in poverty. Governments – including those in North Africa – have a historic role to play in this context in the progressive, but complete, inclusion of the informal sector: a powerful lever for broadening the tax base, increasing tax transparency and market rules, but also for guiding economic priorities and creating added value, including in the short term for intra-African trade ( AfCFTA ) or large-scale exports.

While discrepancies exist here, as elsewhere, between rhetoric and reality, the historical structural weaknesses of certain economies and the fragility of institutions make the aforementioned bad practices even more detrimental to populations and detrimental to growth. Good governance is not a matter of appearances (for example, after 33 years of military rule, civilian governments have failed, for the past 25 years, to address Nigeria's major problems!). Furthermore, while the recommendations of the World Bank, the IMF, the UN, and others may not all be relevant, the development of sub-Saharan Africa depends less on management skills than on the resolute will to work (or not) towards emergence. One might even wonder whether, to some extent, demographic inaction is not itself a tool for slowing progress and escaping poverty.

2. Will the strong momentum of sustainable development in Africa be sufficient in the coming decades to offer young people the economic opportunities and quality services needed to retain them ? Given projected demographic trends, this is doubtful. Managing this phenomenon would require intervening as early as possible to curb the trend. In rural areas, by rationally revitalizing agriculture, diversifying crops with modern methods, and developing fish farming and agribusiness, food self-sufficiency and reduced imports (paid for in foreign currency) go hand in hand with retaining a population of young people who are currently fleeing villages for major cities. Inland cities are experiencing this same exodus to capitals, where agro-industrial and artisanal ecosystems could be created, based on local skills or the availability of nearby inputs: goodwill and ingenuity abound, but rationality and funding are lacking. International cooperation could do much better in this area, through the transfer of know-how and successful experiences in transposable conditions (Japan, China, Southeast Asia), the implementation of new financing schemes and the promotion of projects that the foreign private sector wishes to reserve for itself (example, initiatives systematically focusing on large solar power plants or hydroelectric dams rather than on medium-sized local projects and the creation of local integration/manufacturing mechanisms).

As already mentioned , access to energy is key to the most inclusive development possible ; this key must be replicated as widely as possible, with adaptations, to give 630 million Africans a chance to no longer be the perennial forgotten victims of growth. Energy availability will also help slow down or partially offset the negative impacts of climate change, which is already driving populations to migrate. Where the private sector will struggle to find a rapid return on investment, multilateral cooperation and well-targeted, consistent aid will provide effective solutions. In this respect, maintaining good bilateral relations will facilitate access to larger and more profitable flows of FDI, directed towards a wide range of sectors. This is a logic that France has disrupted, and which far less legitimate outsiders are trying to exploit.

As for the very large metropolises—one or two megacities in each country—islands of tower blocks rise like obelisks in the desert, at the foot of which a suffocating influx of people huddles, waiting in vain for social mobility to take off. The anarchic sprawl of these mushrooming cities, devoid of stable employment and virtually lacking public services, further complicates issues of health, education, transportation, pollution, and security, fueling street protests. It is urgent to curb this exodus as much as possible by intervening upstream. As for integrating these victims of growth into formal systems, it will require genuine commitment, sustained effort, and innovative solutions.

Faced with this grand illusion of the city, young people migrate to neighboring countries, to the North, and the most daring to Europe or even further afield. The mismatch between the supply and demand for skilled jobs, and insufficient or underpaid opportunities, also pushes a growing number of graduates to emigrate (for example, Cameroonians are the third largest beneficiaries of skilled immigration programs in Quebec, after the French and Chinese, ahead of Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians) . Intra-African mobility is facilitated by communication in French or English, languages spoken in most countries on the continent, which does not always go hand in hand with successful integration, especially when foreign communities appear too large, close-knit, or prosperous, thus creating reactions of rejection—a phenomenon that some communities have experienced firsthand in Europe. The AfCFTA could encourage these movements, provided that some countries take off to the point of experiencing labor shortages, which is quite possible. The flows should then be organized and controlled.

On the other side of the Mediterranean, in France for example, in 2023, INSEE (the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) estimated the foreign immigrant population (i.e., non-naturalized) at 5.6 million, representing 8.2% of the total population living in the country. This population is comprised of 48% residents born in Africa (including 2.1 million in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and 1.38 million in sub-Saharan Africa), 33% born in Europe, and 19% in the rest of the world. Whether skilled or not, this workforce shares the endemic problem of unemployment, which has been a source of concern for politicians for the past 50 years, without any solutions being found. This situation is expected to change dramatically in the coming decades for the reasons outlined above: a rising proportion of senior citizens, declining growth and productivity, accompanied by a birth rate consistently below the replacement level, with a fertility rate of 1.7 children per woman.

As has happened in the past, France and Europe will have a critical need for foreign labor to support growth and generate wealth, which will benefit a growing proportion of senior consumers. It is essential to prepare for this by establishing bilateral agreements that define the scope of training programs, levels of education, teacher training, the number of beneficiaries, and so on, from universities and business schools to industrial and agricultural technical sectors. The goal is mutually beneficial agreements for employment both locally and in the partner country, thus fostering economic cooperation partnerships instead of short-term and ineffective migration policies.

Despite a questionable approach, coupled with communication that prioritizes short-term politics and diplomacy at the expense of preserving long-standing bilateral relationships, France, more than other European nations, is better positioned to forge genuine, privileged, and meaningful, yet non-exclusive, partnerships with a large number of African countries. This is in the interest of the French, and equally so, of any potential partner in Africa. Africa is home to 5,000 French companies, employing over 500,000 people and generating an annual turnover of €100 billion. This French presence represents the second-largest stock of investment on the continent (€63 billion). As the president of the CIAN (French Council of Investors in Africa) rightly points out, "The challenge for companies in Africa is to prioritize the long term over the short term, without being intimidated by upheavals." Myopia improves with time, but there is no age limit for trying to see more clearly: in a particularly unstable world, strong African partnerships will advance their actors, perhaps faster than elsewhere!

Sources : World Bank, International Monetary Fund, UN/UNDP, Ibrahim Moe Index, McKinsey, Transparency International, INSEE, Jakkie Cilliers (ISS Institute for Security Studies, South Africa), Patrick Smith “ Africa insights”, CIAN, UNCTAD.